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Abstract 
 
We analyze the determinants of the compensation of private college and 
university presidents from 1999 through 2007.  We find that the fraction of 
institutional revenue derived from current donations is negatively associated with 
compensation and that presidents of religiously-affiliated institutions receive 
lower levels of compensation.  Looking at the determinants of contributions, we 
find a negative association between presidential pay and subsequent donations.  
We interpret these results as consistent with the hypotheses that donors to 
nonprofits are sensitive to executive pay and that stakeholder outrage plays a role 
in constraining that pay.  We discuss the implications of these findings for the 
regulation of nonprofits and for our broader understanding of the pay-setting 
process at for-profit as well as nonprofit organizations. 
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1.  Introduction 
The relationship between managerial agency problems and executive pay has been a 
central focus of academic research over the last several decades.  A key question has been 
whether pay practices reflect agency problems or mitigate those problems or both.  The research 
has focused primarily on executive pay in the for-profit sector and, in large part, on public 
company executive pay.1  There has been little research on executive pay in the nonprofit sector, 
which is somewhat odd given the conventional wisdom that agency problems are particularly 
severe in this sector. 
Moreover, the nonprofit sector seems to be a promising laboratory for exploring the 
nuances of one particular theory of the executive pay setting process – the managerial power 
theory.  This theory posits that, given significant agency slack, stakeholder outrage plays a role 
in limiting and shaping executive pay (Bebchuk, Fried, & Walker 2002).  The theory has been 
discussed exclusively in the context of the for-profit sector, but it would seem to be applicable to 
nonprofit organizations that suffer from similar agency problems.  Furthermore, there are a 
number of factors at play in the nonprofit sector that should have a predictable and testable 
impact on the level of executive pay that would trigger outrage or on the extent to which 
directors and executives would be sensitive to outrage that are absent or less pressing in the for-
profit world. 
This paper begins that exploration.  We analyze the compensation of private college and 
university presidents from 1999 through 2007.  We are interested in the determinants of 
president compensation as a matter of independent significance and in what the determinants tell 
us about the persuasiveness of the managerial power theory.  As in the for-profit sector, we find, 
unsurprisingly, that executive compensation is a function of organization size and tenure in 
office.  But we also find evidence consistent with stakeholder outrage constraining executive 
pay.  We find, for example, that president pay is lower at religiously-affiliated institutions.  Of 
course, self-selection could also explain this finding, but the result is consistent with the 
managerial power theory if one assumes, reasonably, we believe, that observer expectations 
regarding “acceptable” levels of president compensation would be lower at religiously affiliated 
institutions.  In addition, we find that president pay is lower at institutions that are more highly 
dependent on current donations as a source of revenue (versus tuition, grants, etc.).  Our theory 
here is that active donors are likely to generate the kind of outrage over pay that would be 
effective in dampening pay and that schools that are relatively insulated from this effect would 
be less constrained in setting president pay. 
The negative association between donations and pay, however, also can be explained 
without resorting to the managerial power theory.  Thus, in order to test the outrage constraint 
                                                 
1 For surveys of the literature on for-profit executive pay, see Murphy (1999), Core et al. (2003), and Frydman & 
Jenter (2010).  There is also an emerging literature on executive pay in the private equity/venture capital arena.  See 
Leslie & Oyer (2009); Jackson (2009). 
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hypothesis further, we look at the impact of pay levels on future giving, and we find a negative 
association, which is consistent with the idea that donors care about pay.  Although this finding 
does not rule out other explanations for the negative association we find between dependence on 
current donations and pay levels, it does confirm a relationship that is a necessary condition for 
our hypothesis to be correct. 
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows.  Part 2 provides background and a 
brief overview of the leading theories of the executive pay setting process.  Part 3 describes our 
data and methods and provides our results.  These results are interpreted in Part 4, and we 
discuss the implications in that Part.  Part 5 concludes. 
2.  Background and Theory 
This Part explains why the managerial power theory of the executive pay setting process 
is as plausibly applicable to the nonprofit sector as to the for-profit sector and why the nonprofit 
sector could provide a useful venue for exploring the nuances of the outrage constraint.  It begins 
with an overview of both the optimal contracting and managerial power theories in the context of 
for-profit executive pay, and then extends the analysis to the nonprofit sector. 
2.1  Public Company Executive Pay 
 There are two competing, but to some degree complementary theories of the executive 
pay setting process at U.S. public companies.  The optimal contracting theory, which dominates 
the corporate finance literature on executive pay, posits that executive pay is designed to 
minimize managerial agency costs that arise from the separation of ownership from control in the 
widely held, Berle/Means corporation.2  As described by Jensen and Meckling (1976), these 
agency costs reflect the divergence between share value maximizing actions of managers and 
managers’ actual actions, plus the monitoring and bonding expenditures (including contracting 
costs) undertaken to reduce that divergence.  Under this view, equity compensation arrangements 
through which managers receive restricted stock, stock options, and the like, and long-term non-
equity incentive plans are seen as minimizing agency costs and contributing to shareholder value 
by tying executive pay to long-term share price performance.  Core et al. (2003). 
 Under the alternative managerial power view, executive pay arrangements are not simply 
a means of combatting agency costs; these arrangements also reflect agency costs.  (Bebchuk et 
al. 2002).  The managerial power story begins with the observation that many features of 
executive compensation arrangements appear to be inconsistent with a share value maximizing 
model. (Bebchuk et al. 2002). The managerial power view posits that executive pay practices do 
not uniformly reflect vigorous bargaining and that executives exert more influence over the 
terms of their pay than would be expected in an arm’s length bargaining situation.  Further, under 
                                                 
2 See, e.g., Core et al. (2003). 
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this view, pressures from competitive markets for capital, products, labor, and corporate control 
are seen as insufficient to significantly constrain executive pay. 
The threat or reality of investor and financial press outrage play an important role in 
disciplining executive compensation under the managerial power view.  (Bebchuk et al. 2002). 
The idea is that executives and outside directors bear personal costs when these constituencies 
become outraged over pay levels or pay practices.  In order to minimize outrage, executives and 
their boards seek out low salience channels of compensation and other means of camouflaging 
compensation.  The result under the managerial power view is that public company executives 
receive both more pay and different forms of pay than they would in a well-functioning market, 
all of which is costly for shareholders. 
Prior theory has not specified exactly the mechanism of action for the outrage constraint.  
One possible view, along the lines of Ostrom (1990), is that outrage comprises a set of social 
sanctions on managers who extract excessive rents: The firm is a cooperative enterprise, and 
participants impose largely intangible punishment on those whom they know to be violating the 
implicit cooperative norm.3  Or, more broadly, managers may face judgment from their friends 
and peers for violating social norms.  A third possibility is that outrage represents latent action 
on the part of other stakeholders, action that could be motivated by emotion or ideology.  The 
literature on collective action reports that emotional and ideological commitment often are key 
factors in groups that successfully overcome free riding (e.g., Hardin 1982, Knoke 1998, 
Vesterlund 2006).  Managers would then aim to avoid “outrage” as a way of ensuring that their 
principals continue to monitor only loosely.     
 Evidence supporting the managerial power theory of the executive pay setting process in 
the public company setting is largely indirect.  For example, we observe that executives and 
boards camouflage compensation by emphasizing relatively opaque pay channels such as 
deferred compensation (Bebchuk & Jackson 2005) or backdating stock options (Walker 2007) 
and we infer that they do so to minimize outrage over pay levels.  Some commentators have 
argued that insufficient pay for performance sensitivity (Jensen & Murphy 1990) or a lack of 
relative performance evaluation (Holmstrom 1982, Rappaport 1999) undermines the 
persuasiveness of the optimal contracting theory, but others remain unconvinced (Hall & 
Liebman 1998, 2000; Baker & Hall 2004; Core et al. 2003). 
2.2.  Executive Pay in the Nonprofit Sector 
 Large nonprofit organizations suffer from managerial agency problems that are similar to 
those observed in the for-profit sector, which suggests that the managerial power view of the pay 
setting process may help explain nonprofit executive pay.  As in the case of public companies, 
                                                 
3 We note that punishment may, but need not be, related to the efficacy of the manager’s pay structure as a system 
for incentivizing maximum returns to stakeholders.  Participants may also have preferences for the distribution of 
firm profits that do not align perfectly with the distributionally-neutral optimal incentive structure.   
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large nonprofits are characterized by a separation of ownership from control.  In fact, the 
separation is more severe in the nonprofit sector.  At public companies, it is generally possible 
for a party to accumulate a sufficient number of shares to gain control, and this possibility places 
some upper bound on agency costs.  In the nonprofit sector, there is no market for organizational 
control, and no such upper bound. 
 As in the case of public companies, boards of directors are charged with negotiating 
nonprofit executive pay.  These boards are likely to be relatively weak and the executives 
relatively strong with respect to the pay setting process, and other matters, for the same reasons 
that public company boards are weak and executives strong.4  First, nonprofit outside directors 
are part-timers who typically spend a small fraction of their time exercising oversight over the 
organization, while the full time executives set the agenda and control the flow of information to 
the outside directors.  Second, the outside directors are not spending their own money when they 
negotiate executive pay.  In fact, while public company directors are increasingly compensated 
with equity, which may encourage them to think and act more like owners, most nonprofit 
outside directors have little or no economic interest in their organizations.  Third, as in the case 
of public companies, nonprofit outside directors are likely to be bound to the senior executives 
through various formal and informal ties that encourage a culture of deference to the executives.5 
 Moreover, external market forces are even less likely to provide effective discipline over 
the executive pay-setting process in the nonprofit sector.  As noted above, there is no 
organizational control market in the nonprofit sector, and, given the nature of the sector, markets 
for capital and products are likely to be much less efficient than in the for-profit sector.   
These disabilities have been recognized and the law does provide some responses.  State 
attorneys general have responsibility for nonprofit oversight, including oversight of nonprofit 
executive pay.  But state AGs are subject to their own agency problems and resource constraints 
and it seems unreasonable to expect state AGs to provide discipline over any but the most 
egregious cases of excessive nonprofit executive pay.6 
The “intermediate sanctions” rules of the tax code provide another possible upper bound 
on nonprofit executive pay, but are unlikely to tightly constrain that pay.7  Under these rules, 
                                                 
4 Citations throughout this paragraph are from  Bebchuk et al. (2002). 
5 Although the intermediate sanctions rules that are discussed below essentially require that nonprofit directors that 
approve executive pay not have a conflict of interest, that standard insures only a very modest degree of 
independence.  Efforts to increase outside director independence in the for-profit sector, such as by removing inside 
directors from board nominating committees, generally have not carried over to the nonprofit sector.  IRS 
regulations do reward board independence in certain situations, using independence as a plus factor in the 
determination of public charity status (Treas. Reg. 1.509(a)), but for many nonprofits, such as the institutions of 
higher education that are the focus of this study, public charity status is automatic (IRC 509(a)(1)) and this lever is 
unimportant.   
6 For a concise review of state resources devoted to nonprofit supervision, see Dukeminier et al. (2010: 785-86). 
7 IRC § 4958.  These sanctions are described as “intermediate” in the sense that they are less draconian than 
revoking a nonprofit organization’s tax-exempt status. 
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significant financial penalties can be imposed on nonprofit executives and directors who engage 
in “excess benefit transactions,” which include the provision of excessive executive pay.  
However, a safe harbor lies in a rebuttable presumption that transactions, including awards of 
pay, are not excess benefit transactions if 1) they are approved in advance by a nonprofit board 
or committee composed of individuals who have no conflict of interest, 2) the board or 
committee obtained and relied on appropriate data in determining pay, and 3) the board or 
committee adequately documented the basis for its decision.  If these criteria are met, the burden 
shifts to the IRS to show that a pay grant was an excess benefit transaction.  While the 
intermediate sanctions rules strongly encourage nonprofits to follow certain procedures in setting 
executive pay, they are unlikely to provide significant discipline on the substance of these 
awards. 
Therefore it seems quite plausible that the managerial power view would to some extent 
characterize the executive pay setting process in the nonprofit sector.  Other stakeholders rarely 
have both incentives and resources to closely monitor executive pay.     
Like their for-profit counterparts, though, nonprofit managers may experience some 
personal cost if others believe that the manager receives excessive compensation.  By definition 
nonprofit organizations do not share a cooperative venture with investors, but they do have 
donors, beneficiaries or customers, and employees.  Nonprofit managers are also likely to be 
particularly sensitive to more general social perception of their pay.  Most theorists of the sector 
believe that a portion of managers’ rewards for working at a nonprofit include the “warm glow” 
of social approbation that comes with signaling to the public that the manager has sacrificed for 
the public good.8  And, lastly, nonprofit managers may be constrained by latent stakeholder 
responses to higher reported pay.  Warm glow is an important motive for donors (Vesterlund 
2006, Bernheim & Rangel 2008, Andreoni & Payne 2011).  If donors’ attachment to the 
nonprofit is diminished by emotional or ideological disappointment in its leader’s pay, donations 
may fall, leaving the manager with fewer resources available to pursue her own goals.9                             
Anecdotal evidence supports the notion that nonprofit executives and boards are sensitive 
to the perception of their pay practices.  Like their for-profit brethren, nonprofit executives often 
receive a considerable portion of their total compensation in less visible forms, such as deferred 
compensation and perquisites (Atwell & Wellman 2000).  Moreover, some nonprofit executives 
receive only a portion of their compensation directly from their employer with the balance 
coming from an outside foundation (Chronicle of Higher Education 2011). Aside from 
                                                 
8 See Leete (2006) for a review and Galle (2010) for more extended discussion. 
9 The role of the press in this story is unclear.  The press may serve simply as an intermediary – the means by which 
information is passed to the stakeholders who express approbation or disapprobation – or the press may contribute 
more directly to an outrage constraint if managers are sensitive to adverse press coverage independent of  its impact 
on donors, employees, and other stakeholders. 
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camouflaging total compensation, it is difficult to imagine what purpose is served by splitting 
compensation in this way.10 
It thus appears that the threat or reality of what Bebchuk et al. (2002) term “outrage” 
could play an important role in disciplining the pay of nonprofit executives.     
2.3 Differences in the Outrage Mechanism that Prompt Study of Nonprofit 
Executive Pay 
Although we believe that an outrage constraint is likely to play a role in both for-profit 
and nonprofit executive pay, it may be easier to test for in the nonprofit sector.  As noted above, 
evidence from the for-profit sector of the managerial power theory and the impact of an outrage 
constraint is largely inferential – we see that executives and boards camouflage compensation 
and deduce that they do so to minimize outrage – but there are few, if any, differences between 
firms in a particular subsector (say manufacturing or utilities) that would have a predictable and 
testable impact on the outrage constraint and thus pay levels at various firms.  By contrast, there 
are several factors at play in the nonprofit sector (and absent or of less significance in the for-
profit sector) that should have a differential impact on the outrage constraint within nonprofit 
subsectors and that may provide more compelling evidence of the existence and scope of that 
constraint. 
1.  Religious Affiliation.  Although religious affiliation may have little or no impact on 
the scope or demands of an executive’s job, observers may feel that the head of an organization 
with a religious affiliation should be paid at a relatively low level.  They may feel that the 
charitable nature of the organization should extend to its senior management.  At one level, we 
would simply expect a more strongly negative visceral reaction to the announcement that the 
president of a religiously affiliated college received $1 million in pay than we would to the same 
announcement with respect to the president of an otherwise identical secular college.  At a 
deeper level, the theory here is that donors to “commercial” nonprofits are more likely to simply 
be customers purchasing a product, while donors to organizations with a clearer ideological 
mission will derive a greater measure of utility from the “warm glow” of giving.11  Customers 
purchasing a product may view high pay simply as a signal of quality.  In contrast, high pay can 
diminish the warm glow of giving by contradicting donors’ distributive or other ideological 
preferences, and by undermining the social consensus that the organization is “noble” or 
“worthy”; if insiders won’t sacrifice on behalf of the organization, that could be taken as a signal 
that less-informed supporters shouldn’t, either (Marwell & Oliver 1993).   
In sum, we would expect the outrage constraint to be set at a relatively lower level and to 
result in relatively lower executive pay at organizations with a religious affiliation.  To be sure, 
                                                 
10 Some state institutions reportedly rely on compensation from multiple sources to avoid state-law caps on public 
employee salaries (Monks 2007).  But there is no comparable explanation for the practice among private entities.   
11 See Andreoni 1990 for a general discussion of warm glow motives in giving. 
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though, there would be competing explanations, such as self-selection, for a finding of a negative 
association between religious affiliation and pay levels. 
2.  Exposure to Current Donations.  Nonprofit organizations receive funds from 
operations, government grants, donations, and other sources; and relative dependence on these 
sources varies.12  Again, we expect that because donors are more motivated by “warm glow,” 
they are generally more sensitive to perceived excess executive pay than are other revenue 
providers, such as customers (e.g., university students or hospital patients) or grant-making 
agencies.13  At least under our first and third theories of “outrage,” differences in firms’ sources 
of funding should differentially impact compensation.  If outrage consists of social sanctions 
from other firm stakeholders, or represents the threat of more tangible latent stakeholder action, 
executives of nonprofit organizations (and their boards) that are relatively more exposed to 
potential outrage on the part of current donors because current donations make up a relatively 
large portion of revenues may feel more constrained in providing high levels of executive pay.  
Our second suggested mechanism, more general social disapprobation, could also be at play if 
managers’ social circles tend to give more recognition to leaders of organizations with greater 
donor support. Thus, we would expect that all else being equal, nonprofit executive pay levels 
decline with the fraction of revenues that consists of current donations.14   
3.  Unionization.  Other factors may be present in both the for-profit and nonprofit sectors 
but may have a differing impact on the outrage constraint in the two sectors.  For example, we 
would expect unionized employees to be more effective critics of high executive pay than non-
unionized, generally less well-organized employees.  Moreover, unionized employees may 
provide a more effective voice at nonprofit organizations because nonprofit managers will have 
somewhat greater difficulty in assigning responsibility for pay levels to market forces.  If so, the 
disciplining effect of unionization may be more discernible in the nonprofit sector.  
4.  Cross-subsector Differences.  One might also expect that there would be differences 
between nonprofit subsectors that would have a predictable impact on the outrage constraint and 
pay levels.  For example, one might expect that, all else equal, pay levels would be greater in 
nonprofit subsectors that are more closely associated with for-profit activities (e.g., hospitals) 
than in nonprofit subsectors that are viewed as pure charities (e.g., provision of aid to the poor 
and victims of disaster relief).  It does not seem practical, however, to separate the impact of the 
                                                 
12 If nonprofit line employees substitute “warm glow” for salary (Ben-Ner 1996), they are in effect donors to the 
firm and should be sensitive to executive pay in the same way. 
13 Hansmann (1981) suggests that all purchasers of services from a firm whose product is difficult to monitor would 
be suspicious of managerial rent extraction.  Our argument, though, is that some customers are only purchasing 
goods or services, while others are also purchasing warm glow.       
14 Again, however, the story may be more complicated.  As Hansmann (1981) describes, consumers may view the 
nonprofit form as indicating commitment not to divert profits to private actors.  Excessive compensation might 
undermine that perception and affect product sales by a nonprofit. Thus, to the extent that a nonprofit provides 
goods or services, we might expect that nonprofit executive pay levels would also decline with the fraction of 
revenues consisting of sales.   
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outrage constraint from other factors that would differentially impact pay levels across 
subsectors (e.g., higher levels of pay for nonprofit hospital executives resulting from higher pay 
levels enjoyed by for-profit hospital executives).  As a result, our investigation is limited to pay 
variations within a nonprofit subsector, specifically private colleges and universities. 
2.4  Other Considerations that Impact the Study of Managerial Power over Pay in 
the Nonprofit Sector 
 Although the factors discussed in the previous section lead us to think that the nonprofit 
sector should be a fertile laboratory for the study of managerial power and the outrage constraint, 
other factors may make it more difficult for us to find strong evidence.  For example, the factors 
discussed in the previous section are not institution specific, and in some cases institution 
specific factors, such as particularly active press coverage, may swamp the impact of donors, 
unionization, or religious affiliation.  Also, while nonprofit executive pay has grown 
substantially in recent years, the growth and diversity in pay does not match that of the for-profit 
sector.  Part of the explanation may lie in a difference in technology.  Without equity 
compensation, it is unlikely that public company executive pay would have grown to present 
levels.  This is not to suggest that there is inadequate variation in nonprofit executive pay, but 
only that the signal to noise ratio may be somewhat lower in this sector.   
 2.5 Prior Literature 
 Prior studies have established that the compensation of university presidents bears a fair 
relationship to the demands of the job and the personal characteristics of the president.  
Boulanger & Pliskin (1999), in a cross-section drawn from the CHE data for 1995-1996, find 
that university expenditures, presidential tenure in office, and admissions selectivity are 
correlated with higher pay.  Similarly, Tang et al. (1996), using data from 1991, find correlations 
between pay and expenditures, rankings, and Carnegie classification. 
 Ehrenberg et al. (2001) were the first to employ panel data to analyze the determinants of 
university president compensation.  They find little sensitivity of pay to most performance 
measures, such as changes in selectivity or endowment.15  They do find, though, some evidence 
that successful fundraising increases a president’s compensation.  Sorokina (2003), using an 
academic-year 2000 cross-section and a panel ranging from 1997 to 2000, finds that college 
“ranking” correlates with compensation, but finds no evidence that the percent of alumni 
donating has any effect on presidents’ pay.  Monks (2007) confirms these earlier findings in a 
small-sample study aimed primarily at identifying differences between public and private 
university pay.  And Banker et al. (2009), also using a panel drawn from CHE and NCES data, 
find that presidential experience, university “success” measures such as SAT scores, endowment, 
and faculty salaries, and organizational complexity contribute to higher pay. 
                                                 
15 Frumkin & Keating (2001) find similar insensitivity between pay and performance for the sector more generally. 
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 In contrast, there is relatively little existing work examining our questions here.  Oster 
(1998) hypothesized that nonprofit executive compensation might be related to religious 
affiliation and constrained by dependence on donors.  Using a small cross-section of fifty-seven 
universities, Oster found no significant impact of the university’s ability to spend out of 
endowment on presidents’ pay.  However, Oster did find some relation between dependence on 
donations and compensation in a slightly larger group of ninety-five nonprofits (only a handful 
of them educational organizations), albeit with very limited institutional or personal-
characteristic controls.  Similar in spirit and method is Saunders (2007), which finds that 
presidents of religiously-affiliated colleges earned about $25,000 less than their peers during the 
2005 academic year, and presidents at a small group of self-identified Christian fundamentalist 
schools another $22,000 less. 
 Langbert and Fox (2011) examined university president pay using cross-sectional data for 
the 1999-2000 and 2005-2006 academic years in a study motivated by the broader executive 
compensation debate.  They concluded that presidents are primarily paid for performance as 
measured through enrollments, SAT scores, and peer assessment, but they also found a negative 
association between the rate of alumni giving and president pay, which might be viewed as a 
“noisy” measure of dependence on current donations.  Langbert and Fox also found that the 20% 
of the presidents in their sample who were hired from within the university were paid less than 
their externally hired counterparts.16  In addition, studies of the nonprofit sector generally show 
some relationship between principal-agent slack and compensation; for example, Frumkin & 
Keating (2001) find that free cash flows tend to correlate with higher pay. 
Aside from the forgoing, we are not aware of any prior research examining the 
relationship between the compensation of college and university presidents and donations and/or 
religious affiliation.  Moreover, our ability to test the Oster (1998) hypotheses using a large 
panel, more precise specification of the variables of interest, and a diverse set of institutional and 
personal controls, offers a significant advance over the current state of the literature. 
3.  Data, Methods, and Outcomes 
 3.1 Data 
                                                 
16 Langbert and Fox argue that this evidence is inconsistent with the managerial power hypothesis because internal 
hires “ought to have institution-specific human capital” and “more extensive ties to the Boards of Trustees” that 
should result in higher pay, all else being equal.  The value of human capital would be more central to the optimal 
contracting view than the managerial power view of the pay-setting process.  Moreover, we would not expect 
university provosts or other lower ranking university officials to have much managerial power.  Thus, we do not 
view this as evidence contrary to that theory.  Employees signing their first contract with a charitable organization 
are exempt from IRS rules limiting excessive compensation, supplying a potential tax reason for outside hires to be 
paid more. Finally, we suspect that the results here may be driven in part by the fact that interim presidents would 
typically be internal hires and would be paid less than permanent hires.   
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In this paper, we explore the compensation of presidents of private colleges and 
universities. 17  Our data derive from three main sources.  President salaries and other 
compensation come from the annual compilation by the Chronicle of Higher Education (CHE).  
CHE’s figures in turn were harvested from Form 990 tax returns filed by the respective 
organizations.  Most other institution-level data, including religious affiliation, were downloaded 
from the National Center on Education Statistics (NCES).  NCES derives its data from 
regulatory filings required by the U.S. Department of Education.  We obtained each school’s 
fundraising costs, as well as other data used in our instrumental-variable regressions, by 
matching NCES data with corresponding university tax return information from the National 
Center on Charitable Statistics.  In addition, we hand-collected unionization and U.S. News 
ranking information for each school, as well as some demographic data on presidents, such as 
each individual’s tenure in office.  We deflated all dollar amounts to real values using the CPI.  
Our sample comprises all of the colleges and universities appearing both in the CHE 
“Private Universities” survey and the NCES data for each of the nine years between 1999 and 
2007.18   Three hundred forty-one institutions met these criteria.  Although there is some chance 
that limiting the sample only to universities that appear for nine consecutive years could 
introduce survivor bias, we view that as the lesser risk.  Start-up organizations, or those on the 
edge of collapse, may differ significantly in their organizational dynamic from the typical, long-
standing and stable entities that make up most of the sample.  In addition, the Chronicle omits 
certain forms of educational organization, such as community colleges, from its survey.  Entities 
in transition to or from such a dramatic change in their educational mission also are likely to be 
unrepresentative of universities as a whole.  Our sample extends back as far as NCES data permit 
for our variables of interest, and terminates at 2007 to avoid the potentially confounding effects 
of a severe recession on charitable giving.     
We also drop select observations within the sample to account for the limitations of our 
data.  All of our regressions omit president-academic year pairs for which the reported salary of 
the president was zero.  In all cases, as best we can tell, these observations can be explained by 
the fact that the president in question belongs to a religious order whose members forswear 
material wealth.  In many instances the president’s order is reimbursed for his or her services, but 
                                                 
17 We omit public universities for a number of reasons.  Most critically, data are limited and less reliable.  Public 
universities are exempted by Treasury rule from having to file tax returns; while some do so voluntarily, most do 
not.  Similarly, public universities are exempt from federal rules governing executive compensation at nonprofits, 
implying that the coefficients on each of our predictive variables would likely differ significantly between the two 
groups.  Adding interaction effects to account for that difference would substantially diminish the precision of our 
estimates.   Finally, public universities also have many additional stakeholders, such that it is possible outrage 
functions in a wholly different way in that sector; prior literature suggests a variety of political factors that impact 
public university funding but that likely would have only minimal effect on private institutions.  (Lowry 2001; see 
also Ehrenberg 2004 for a brief review). 
18 Although our study focuses on the period 1999 to 2007, we use lagged data for some variables. 
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the precise amount cannot be discerned.19  We also drop institution-years in which more than one 
individual served as president.  CHE’s data do not make clear whether the figures reported for 
partial-year service represent annualized or actual compensation, leaving us unable to determine 
the correct amount to include.  Moreover, compensation provided in transitional years may not 
be representative of steady-state pay levels.          
 Descriptive Statistics 
 <Table 1> 
 3.2  Determinants of Compensation  
 For our main regression analysis, we construct a panel of 341 universities over six 
years.20  The dependent variable in our reported results is total annual reported compensation, as 
provided by CHE.    Methods of computing and reporting non-salary awards reportedly vary 
between organizations (Niklin 2000).   If this variation were random its only effect would be to 
reduce the precision of estimates of the determinants of true compensation (Baum 2006: 217).  
As we discuss in 4.1 below, however, it is likely that reporting error is not random.  Therefore 
our results are best interpreted as measuring the determinants and effects of reported, rather than 
actual, compensation. We also obtain qualitatively similar results when salary is the dependent 
variable. 
 We measure the importance of stakeholder outrage for president compensation through 
three main explanatory variables -- the proportion of the university’s annual budget derived from 
contributions and gifts, institutional religious affiliation, and faculty or staff unionization.   
As explained above, dependence on gifts captures to some degree donors’ leverage over 
the organization and its managers, and therefore should be correlated with the organization’s 
preferences for higher or lower pay.21  President pay and contributions may be related through 
more than one channel, however, complicating our analysis.  As prior literature reports 
(Ehrenberg et al. 2001), boards tend to reward successful fundraisers.  This positive correlation 
between pay and donations may obscure the negative correlation our outrage theory predicts.  A 
series of annual scatterplots and nonlinear fit lines for the two variables confirmed our suspicion 
that the combination of the two effects resulted in a nonlinear relationship.  Accordingly, we also 
include a measure for the nonlinear effects of dependence on donations. 
                                                 
19 For example, the 2009 Form 990 for Boston College reports that the university paid over $3 million to the Society 
of Jesuits in return for services rendered to BC by members of the order.  But the return does not separately identify 
how much was paid for each individual employee.   
As best we can tell, universities that pay their leaders a meaningful salary do not also compensate the leaders’ 
clerical order for their services.   
20 NCES’s SAT-score data go back only to the 2002 academic year; we hand-collect SAT data for 1999 through 
2002 from U.S. News and World Reports.   
21 We obtain quantitatively similar results when using alternative measures of the university’s dependence on gifts, 
such as gifts as a percentage of expenditures or gifts per student.   
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 Endogeneity may present an additional challenge.  Unobserved aspects of presidential 
ability, such as strong leadership and fundraising skills, could simultaneously drive both giving 
and presidential pay.  Outside shocks to regional wealth or inflation could also drive both giving 
and pay.  Our primary solution to these problems is fixed effects.  We use individual presidents 
as a panel variable; since we use random-effects models, each observation includes a weighted 
fixed effect for each president.22  That should control for unobservable variation in presidential 
ability and human capital.23  Similarly, our state and year fixed effects help to account for the 
impact of local economic factors.  In any event, all of these relationships would tend to produce a 
positive relationship between pay and donations.  To the extent that we find a negative 
relationship, it should be in spite of, rather than because of, these unobserved influences.     
A potential complication, as we report in 3.3., below, is that presidential pay can also 
affect donations, implying that regressors derived from total contributions could be correlated 
with lags of our dependent variable.  We would argue that most of this relationship can be 
attributed to individual characteristics of the president already controlled for in the regression, 
such as fundraising prowess and tenure in office.  However, to account for the possibility that 
past shocks to pay may have been due to luck or other factors not unique to the president, we 
also present separately a regression in which we control for lagged compensation.24  Given that 
the first lag of pay is mathematically related to the error term of our regression, we instrument 
for it using the system GMM method of Bond (2002).  Because system GMM relies on first 
differences, we cannot provide estimates of invarying, constantly varying, or small-variation 
variables in that specification.25                  
 As an additional check, we also use 2SLS to include several different instruments for 
donation-dependence.  First, using firm-level data from the National Center on Charitable 
Statistics, we compute the total donations to all institutions of secondary and higher education in 
each state for each year, and divide that by total revenues at those institutions.  Additionally, we 
                                                 
22 The random-effects model assumes that the individual president effects are uncorrelated with our regressors.  
Given the potential relationship between presidential ability and fundraising, that assumption may be implausible. 
As an additional check, we estimate our equation using a population-averaged panel-data model, also known as a 
generalized estimating equation or “GEE.”  (See Gardiner et al. 2009 for an overview of the differences between the 
RE and GEE models).  GEE does not require any assumptions about the relationship between the individual effect 
and the other regressors.  It is, however, more precise if the researchers can specify the nature of the correlation 
between annual error terms.  Standard tests show some evidence for an AR(1) process in the errors, and weak 
evidence for AR(2).  We obtain quantitatively similar results to our random effects model under either assumption.    
23 Of course, using presidents rather than universities as our panel variable means that we cannot control for 
unobserved university characteristics, but we believe that unlike human capital, most of the important pay-
determining variation in institutions is already measured in our other data.   
24 We obtain similar results controlling only for first or for both first and second lags of compensation.     
25 Although generally system GMM is more efficient than alternatives such as Hausman-Taylor, to capture estimates 
of the time-invarying variables we also estimate a Hausman-Taylor regression in which we treat percent gifts and 
percent gifts squared as endogenous to the president fixed effects.  We again obtain quantitatively similar results to 
our OLS regression---and therefore rather more precisely estimated coefficients than our system GMM regression--- 
except that the effect of religious affiliation is now similar in size to our OLS regression (at -41,759) but less 
precisely estimated, so that it is significant only at the 10% level.  (We used Schaffer & Stillman’s “xtoverid” Stata 
routine to obtain cluster-robust standard errors for the Hausman-Taylor regressions).   
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use fundraising expenditures, which are strongly correlated with donations, but have no obvious 
causal connection to executive compensation.26  Since we have no clear theoretical prior on 
whether overall fundraising is more important than fundraising per student, we employ both.  In 
all cases, we use squares of the IV variables to instrument for percent-grants squared. 
Our other tests for the existence of an outrage constraint involve indicator variables for 
whether the university is religiously affiliated and whether its faculty or staff is unionized.  
Unionized faculty or staff might focus outrage over president pay more effectively than non-
unionized employees.  We also hypothesize that the outrage threshold may be lower at 
religiously-affiliated organizations that are perceived to have a more public-spirited mission.  As 
we noted earlier, however, relatively low president pay in the latter case could also result from 
self-selection by warm-glow motivated individuals into religious organizations.      
In addition to donors and employees, several other constituencies could conceivably be 
sources of outrage, but we do not expect to see any effects from the university’s dependence on 
these other sources of revenue.  Hansmann (1981) suggests that customers of a nonprofit are 
concerned about self-dealing, but, as he notes, free riding among customers is likely to be 
pervasive for organizations of any size.  Similarly, private universities receiving government 
research grants could be subject to heightened expectations and scrutiny from taxpayers or 
lawmakers.  But given the opacity of most research grants and the attenuated connection between 
research funding and the availability of money for presidential pay, we would be surprised to see 
any significant impact of grants on pay in the private-university setting.  Nonetheless, we include 
total tuition and total grants as regressors.         
We also include a vector of control variables, many inspired by prior literature.  As we 
described in 2.5, above, researchers have found that organizational size, complexity, and status 
influence presidents’ pay, so we control for those factors using total revenues, total full-time 
equivalent enrollment, log of total assets,27 size of the faculty, faculty:FTE ratio, faculty mean 
salary, whether the university has a teaching hospital, U.S. News and World Report ranking,28 
and seventy-fifth percentile SAT scores for the entering first-year class. 29   To account for the 
                                                 
26 Conceivably, a nonprofit executive could extract value from the nonprofit by operating a fundraising firm and 
then contracting with the firm to do fundraising for the nonprofit.  But most universities have policies that prohibit 
presidents from such extensive outside activity, and obvious conflicts of interest at that level would seldom escape 
close scrutiny.  In addition, it might be argued that, to the extent the president is involved in fundraising, a portion of 
the university’s reported fundraising costs may include a fraction of the president’s salary.  Average fundraising 
expenditures in our sample, however, were orders of magnitude larger than average president pay; changes in 
president pay should have no meaningful impact on reported fundraising.       
27 We use the natural log of assets because assets are highly skewed in our sample.  Readers should accordingly 
interpret our coefficient as a semi-elasticity.     
28 We control for U.S. News rankings using indicator variables for U.S. News tiers in each of the research university 
and liberal arts college undergraduate hierarchies.  Unranked schools were coded as “third tier.”  U.S. News used a 
different  reporting methodology for the 2002 academic year; regressions including U.S. News ranking omit data 
from that year; including 2002 but omitting U.S. News ranking does not change our results.      
29 SAT scores and U.S. News rankings are highly correlated.  Unsurprisingly, omitting one tends to produce 
considerably more significant results for the other.  Our main outcomes are robust to including only one of the two.   
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possibility that executive salaries are influenced by peer compensation, we additionally include 
the mean total compensation in the sample.     
In addition to president fixed effects, we attempt to account for variations in the quality 
of each president in several other different ways.  Although outcome measures are notoriously 
difficult to identify in nonprofit settings, we include return on assets and graduation rate as 
approximations of the president’s success at managing the budget and ensuring student success.  
Since presidents likely develop fundraising connections and learn from experience, we also 
hand-collected and included each president’s tenure in office.      
To account for differences in organizational focus and mission, we include a set of 
indicator variables for each of the major Carnegie Institution categories, such as “research 
university” and “liberal-arts college.”  (Ehrenberg et al. 2001 report significant variations in pay 
practices by Carnegie category).  We also include a full set of state and year fixed effects, which 
we expect to account for any variations in macro-economic factors, the tax-price of giving, or 
major regulatory differences across time and institutions.   
Finally, as in Sorokina (2003), we employ lags of all of our regressors.  Presidential 
salaries are set in advance of the academic year.  The factors that determine compensation should 
logically be those prevailing at that time.  Although of course there is usually a strong correlation 
between most regressors and their lags, such that other studies using same-year data are likely 
still largely reliable, we believe our measures are more precise.  
We employ a random-effects model with robust standard errors clustered by president.30  
Our main results are reported in Table 2, below.  For ease of reading, we omit state, year, and 
Carnegie-category effects and most insignificant controls.  
<Table 2> 
Overall, we find some support for our donor and religious-affiliation hypotheses.  We 
find two strong, opposing effects of increasing dependence on donations on presidential pay.  In 
all of the specifications the linear effect is negative, significant at least at the 5% level, and 
economically substantial in magnitude.  For example, the OLS coefficient implies that a one-
standard deviation increase in percent of revenue from gifts, which is about a 19% bump, would 
correspond to $54,583 (in 1983 dollars) less reported compensation as a result of the linear 
effect, or about $111,426 in 2007 dollars.31  For comparison, the median total compensation in 
the sample is $370,325 in 2007 dollars.  At the same time, greater donations also lead to higher 
pay; our nonlinear effect was positive in sign, and significant at the 5% level.   
                                                 
30 A Hausman test could not reject the null hypothesis that the RE estimator was consistent, confirming that the 
random-effects model was appropriate. 
31 The coefficient on the percent gift variable in our GEE regression is a bit smaller, at -203,261, and significant at 
the 1% level.     
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Admittedly, the 2SLS regression provides surprisingly large coefficients for the effects of 
donation-dependence.  We argue that our OLS result is probably biased upwards, but the 
difference here seems too large to be explained solely by bias in the OLS estimate.  Weak 
instruments would be a logical suspect, except that LIML estimates of the coefficients were quite 
close to those reported, which argues against a weak instrument problem.  (Angrist & Pischke 
2009).  Possibly one or more of the instruments are picking up some other unobserved 
influence.32  Accordingly, we view the 2SLS results as only weakly confirming our results.    
Turning to the other measures of outrage, we find significant constraints only from 
religious affiliation.  Our OLS panel data confirm the cross-sectional results of Saunders (2007) 
that religiously-affiliated presidents report lower average compensation --- almost $88,000 less 
(in 2007 dollars) in our sample.  As expected, we find no evidence that grants or tuition constrain 
reported presidential pay.  Indeed, the sign of the coefficient on tuition is positive and significant.  
We examine several possible explanations for this finding in the discussion section. 
We further find significant results with the expected sign for a number of our institutional 
and personal-characteristic controls.  Schools with more resources pay more, and presidents earn 
more the longer they are in office.  President and faculty salaries tend to move in the same 
direction, though no doubt some portion of that correlation is due to simultaneous shocks to the 
academic labor market.    
3.3 Determinants of Contributions 
In order for donor dependence to constrain presidential pay in the manner we have 
hypothesized, it must be the case that donors care about presidential pay levels.  In other words, 
donor sensitivity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the proposition that dependence 
on current donations dampens pay levels.  We test donor sensitivity to compensation through an 
analysis of the determinants of annual giving. 
Again, we construct a panel derived from CHE compensation data and institutional 
variables from NCES and NCCS.  Our dependent variable is simply total annual giving.  Since 
donors must first learn of compensation before they react to it, and the main source of 
compensation information is annual tax return data filed up to fifteen months after the beginning 
of the academic year, we expect to see any impact on giving only at some remove from the 
actual year of payment.  Thus our main regressors of interest are lags of reported 
compensation.33 
                                                 
32 Another potential explanation is that university donations also affect state-level donations.  The mean proportion 
of university to state donations in our sample was 8%, which may suggest that the state-level donations instrument is 
not fully exogenous.  To test this, we repeated our regressions, dropping observations where the university’s 
contributions to state donations exceeded 10%.  This brought the mean down to 2.3%, but we still obtained the same 
large coefficients.   
33 Our results using only salary, or using the difference between compensation and mean president compensation, as 
the main variables of interest are essentially identical.   
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Relying on lags also mitigates any endogeneity concerns.  Our earlier results suggest both 
that higher pay can reduce giving and also that successful fundraising can increase pay.  But, of 
course, compensation in 2000 cannot be a reward for successful fundraising in 2002.  
Admittedly, though, both high compensation and generous contributions may be the products of 
some third variable we cannot measure, such as the charm, gregariousness, social connections, or 
talent of the president.  Once more, we control for these possibilities by using weighted 
individual president fixed effects.  If these are not fully effective in eliminating the role of 
unobserved human capital, then our coefficient will be biased upwards.  Since we predict a 
negative correlation between pay and donations, the effect of these personal characteristics will 
therefore tend to obscure our hypothesized result.   
As with the determinants of pay regressions, we also report two additional specifications 
as robustness checks on our OLS results.  In one specification we include  lags of donations as a 
control for the possibility that, say, year-2000 donations affected year 2001 compensation.  
Because these long lags quickly chew up our available data, we use difference, rather than 
system, GMM to instrument for lags of donations.   
We also estimate a 2SLS regression using same-year compensation and number of 
executive employees per student as instruments for the lag of compensation.  We suggest that the 
president’s compensation during the same academic year as the dependent variable is an 
appropriate instrument for lags of compensation.  Because both compensation and donations can 
respond to each other only with at least a one-year delay, there should be no simultaneous 
causation between contemporary levels of each.  Although some omitted variable, such as 
university performance, may contribute to both, as in Andreoni & Payne (2011) we control for 
these potential confounds --- in our case, by using president fixed effects and observable 
measures of performance.  Therefore, we arguably should be able to eliminate any correlation 
between same-year pay and the error terms of the regression.  The theory behind the proportion 
of executives is that it measures factors, such as principal-agent slack and institutional 
complexity, that should correlate with pay but do not have any evident direct connection to 
donations.  Both instruments are strongly correlated with lags of compensation in first-stage 
regressions.    
As before, we control for a variety of institutional and other factors, including 
fundraising, fundraising squared, state, year, and Carnegie-category fixed effects.  Because the 
literature suggests that funding from other sources may either crowd in or crowd out private 
contributions (e.g., Okten & Weisbrod 2000, Andreoni & Payne 2010), we control for both 
grants and liabilities.  We attempt to capture variation in fund-raising skill using years in office.  
We also control for measures of mission success, institutional prestige, and wealth of the donors 
with U.S. News ranking, tuition, revenues, assets, mean faculty salary, and graduation rate.  We 
control for the size of the alumni body with enrollment, and for the possibility that 
undergraduates have more intense connections to their alma mater with the fraction of enrollees 
who are undergraduates.  Our results are presented in Table 3.      
18 
 
<Table 3> 
In general, we find an economically substantial and statistically significant negative 
effect of reported compensation on giving in each specification, although in the 2SLS regression 
the effects of compensation on giving are just shy of the 5% significance level.  For example, the 
OLS and GMM regressions suggest that in the aggregate, the first and second lags of 
compensation reduce donations by about $30 per dollar of pay.34  Grants and borrowing appear 
to crowd in contributions in our sample.35  And perhaps surprisingly, we find no evidence that 
longer-tenured presidents are more successful at bringing in funds.  We note that result is 
consistent with our suggestion in 3.2 that presidential fixed effects largely capture the impact of 
presidential human capital.   
Once more, our 2SLS estimates for the main variable of interest are larger than the 
others, although the difference here is not as large.  We therefore interpret the 2SLS result as 
lending some support to the idea that the OLS estimates are biased upwards.   
4.  Discussion 
4.1 Interpreting our Results 
Again, our results are probably best understood as the determinants and effects of 
reported, rather than actual, compensation.  To be sure, the fact that our compensation data are 
drawn from federal tax returns, and therefore that willful misstatements are punishable with jail 
time, adds to our confidence in the accuracy of the numbers.  But prior to 2009, when the IRS 
revised its guidelines for reporting non-cash compensation, there were few established 
conventions for how organizations should account for the present-year value of deferred or in-
kind payments.  CHE’s data for the 2009 academic year (the only publicly-available post-
revision year so far) evince a larger fraction of payment in the form of benefits than we observe 
in our sample.  In light of the empirical evidence of concealed pay in the for-profit context (see 
Bebchuk et al. 2002 for a review), it is reasonable to assume that universities generally reported 
lower annual compensation where that was possible within the existing rules.    
Our hypothesis further suggests that the degree of under-reporting was likely not random.  
We would argue that concealment works to reduce outrage because the average stakeholder 
rationally free-rides on the efforts of others in acquiring compensation information.  When there 
is agency slack, boards of directors can therefore respond to outrage constraints either through 
reductions in real pay or reductions in reported pay.  To avoid tax-fraud prosecution, the board 
can camouflage pay by shifting cash compensation into other forms where reporting rules are 
looser.  For example, the former president of one top research university was, according to its 
                                                 
34 As before, we obtain similar results using GEE to double-check our FE results; the combined effect of lagged 
compensation in the GEE regression was a bit larger, at -45.   
35 Because the crowd-in/crowd-out question is not our focus here, we do not attempt to rule out increased demand 
for the university’s output as a confounding factor in that result.   
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2010 tax return, still collecting over $100,000 per year for his past services, even while not 
retired and still earning a separate salary for serving on its faculty.  (Guidestar.org: Harvard 
University 2010 Form 990).  As best we can tell, that expected cost was not reported during his 
time in office as a cost of his employment.             
Econometrically, the possibility that camouflage substitutes for real reductions means 
that our results are not fully reliable as evidence of the economic importance of compensation 
per se.  If greater donor pressure creates increased incentives to camouflage, and if we were 
trying to measure the determinants of actual rather than reported compensation, then the error 
terms in our regressions would be correlated with the measures of donor pressure.   
However, from a policy perspective, outrage-induced shifts in pay design and reported 
compensation may be as important as reductions in “real” compensation.  As Bebchuk et al. 
(2002) argue in the public company context, compensation arrangements designed with 
camouflage in mind may fail to provide desirable incentives and may even provide perverse 
incentives.36  Whether donor pressure constrains actual compensation, or instead only distorts the 
form in which pay is presented, we have provided evidence that pressure from donor outrage 
changes agents’ behavior.  Likewise, the fact that reported compensation impacts donors’ 
willingness to support the university is significant for policy and for university planning, even if 
donors are not responding to fully accurate information. 
4.2 Primary Results and Alternative Explanations 
Reliance on current donations.  We attribute our finding of a negative association 
between president pay and the fraction of university revenue derived from current donations as 
evidence consistent with the idea that the prospect of donor outrage would have a moderating 
influence on pay.  We buttress this argument with evidence that donors care about and respond to 
president pay levels.  As noted above, Langbert & Fox (2011) find a negative association 
between the percent of alumni who donate and president pay, and one would expect these two 
metrics – dependence on current donations and rate of alumni giving – to be correlated.  
Langbert and Fox label this result counterintuitive, but offer two explanations.  They suggest it 
“plausible” that the alumni giving rate would be a proxy for a teaching orientation and that 
presidents of teaching-oriented schools would be paid at a lower rate.  We control for this 
possibility using grants, Carnegie category and U.S. News ranking, and still find a negative 
influence of donation-dependence on pay.  Second, they suggest that the alumni giving rate may 
reflect the level of alumni involvement in governance, “which may … moderate administrators’ 
salaries.”  We agree.  This latter view is consistent with the outrage hypothesis. 
An early reader commented that unobserved negative shocks to the university’s fortunes, 
such as a major scandal, might provide an explanation for the negative correlation we observe 
                                                 
36 See also Saez et al. (2012) for an argument in the tax context that what appear to be second-order behavioral 
effects can have important efficiency consequences.   
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between pay and the fraction of revenue from current donations.  The theory would be that 
universities are forced to pay a premium to a “fixer” president who will enter after a scandal and 
that the scandal would also depress donations.  This possibility seems unlikely to explain our 
results.  Major scandals are not common, and tests for the influence of outliers showed little 
impact, suggesting that our results are not caused by a few instances of scandal.  This theory 
would also predict that, if the scandal effect is big enough to drive our regression results, then 
first-year presidents should on average receive a pay premium, but we find instead that mean 
compensation is strictly increasing with tenure. 
Our findings on the relation between tuition and compensation lend some additional 
support to our agency-cost story.  Again, we find a fairly sizable, statistically significant 
correlation between tuition and president pay.  That relationship is not simply a measure of 
available resources, since we also control for total revenues and enrollment.  We therefore 
believe the most likely explanations are various forms of free riding.  One possibility is that, 
because of weak monitoring by students and parents, tuition dollars are a less-constraining 
source of funds than others.  Or, similarly, both tuition and high president pay may be the result 
of high agency costs for the university’s principals.  Admittedly, a third story could be that 
tuition is or is perceived to be a measure of institutional quality or consumer demand.  For 
example, we do find a modest correlation between gross tuition (i.e., not net of financial aid) and 
membership in upper-echelon U.S. news rankings in our sample.     
Religious affiliation.  Consistent with the work of others, we show that presidents of 
institutions with a religious affiliation tend to be paid less than presidents of completely secular 
schools.  We argue that one explanation for this effect, consistent with the managerial power 
theory, is that observer thresholds for what constitutes outrageous compensation would be lower 
in the case of religiously affiliated institutions.  But our data do not allow us to test or reject other 
plausible explanations for the association we observe, and it does seem likely to us that self-
selection and substitution of “warm glow” for cash compensation would also contribute to this 
association.  When we include interaction effects of religious affiliation and years in office, we 
see that the initial discount for religiously-affiliated pay is about half that in our other 
regressions, and that the increment for time in office is also smaller.  This may somewhat favor 
the outrage constraint hypothesis, in that it seems as though religious affiliation holds down pay 
in part by reducing its rate of increase, rather than simply by matching managers with lower 
demand for cash to institutions that pay less.   
4.3 Implications for the Managerial Power Theory of the Executive Pay Setting 
Process 
As we described in the background section, to date researchers focused on public 
company executive pay have not found unequivocal proof that outrage constrains compensation.  
Prior evidence has generally been circumstantial; although the fact that boards of directors seem 
to take great pains to diminish the ease with which other stakeholders can add up total pay is 
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highly suggestive, commentators have suggested pro-efficiency explanations for many of these 
“hidden” pay structures.  (E.g., Edmans & Gabaix 2009).  In contrast, we find straightforward 
evidence that dependence on donors puts pressure on universities to reduce reported presidential 
compensation, and that contributor displeasure at high reported compensation is registered 
through lower donations.  We also find evidence consistent with the outrage constraint being set 
at a lower level at institutions with religious affiliations. 
However, even if one views our evidence as supporting the existence of an outrage 
constraint at nonprofit institutions, can we extrapolate to the for-profit sector?  In other words, 
have we found evidence of a general phenomenon or a phenomenon specific to the nonprofit 
universe?  To be sure, donors to universities are a different kind of stakeholder than shareholders 
in a firm.  But the differences may be smaller than they appear at first glance.  In both cases, 
these constituencies are “represented” by a board of directors that, for the reasons discussed 
above, may be disinclined or unable to negotiate vigorously with their chief executives.  At the 
very top, there is a similarity of structure and a similarity in agency problems. 
Moreover, prior research suggests that, just as charitable contributors are motivated in 
part by their emotional connection to their charity (see Bernheim & Rangel 2008 for a review), 
so too many shareholders have preferences for “sustainable” or “no sweat” firms, or other 
markers of their ideological preferences (see Campbell 2007 for a review).  Firms donate to 
charity and shape their political participation in order to shape their image for investors, 
employees, and customers.  In other words, both ideology and return on investment are part of 
the utility function for both nonprofit and for-profit stakeholders.   
Admittedly, universities are also subject to legal limits on pay that do not bind most for-
profit firms.  Perhaps the responsiveness of university executive pay to donors could reflect fears 
that donor ire would trigger IRS scrutiny.  That story is consistent with our results, but would not 
explain our finding that donors themselves respond to compensation news.    
4.4 Implications for Tax Law 
Our results also should be relevant to those interested in the governance and regulation of 
nonprofit entities.  It is conventional wisdom among nonprofit theorists that principal-agent slack 
is pervasive in the sector, especially among large, complex organizations.  Our evidence 
suggests, however, that contributors actually do change the behavior of the firms they support.  
We doubt that most donors intend to use their giving as a governance tool, since rational donors 
would typically free ride on the disciplinary efforts of others.  Instead, we believe our findings 
imply that donors simply derive less warm glow from giving when they are dissatisfied with the 
behaviors they can readily observe. 
If donor pressure does matter at least for some kinds of governance decisions, regulators 
can take steps to improve the usefulness of donor behavior.  For example, nonprofit regulators 
with scare resources---which, in the United States, is all of them (Dukeminier et al. 2010)---may 
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prefer to focus their energies on organizations that are less dependent on donors.  Or they may 
give closer attention to organizations where donations drop noticeably.  Of course, that 
suggestion assumes that donor pressure reduces actual rent-seeking by firm managers, rather 
than simply increasing managers’ efforts to shroud their rents.  Regulations whose goal is to 
affect actual outcomes should ensure that firm disclosures reveal real information about the 
firm.37   
Along these lines, recent revisions to the Form 990 instructions, if followed closely by 
firms, should reduce considerably organizations’ ability to reduce reported compensation without 
also diminishing its value.  For example, the new instructions require the firm to calculate the 
actuarial value of changes in a defined-benefit pension plan, and to report pensions and other 
deferred payments even if not yet vested.  So far, the IRS has made available only one year of 
data under the new reporting regime, so it is too early yet to assess fully the changes’ impact.   
It is unclear to what extent the Form 990 Instructions provide firms with real incentives 
to report accurately.  Failure to comply with the instructions has no consequences, except in the 
extreme case in which managers and preparers are subject to fraud or abuse penalties.   
The IRS could potentially provide firms stronger incentives to report if the new 
disclosure rules were made part of the “4958 safe harbor.”  Organizations and managers that 
follow certain procedures, such as requiring CEO compensation to be set by independent board 
members after review of relevant comparable salary information for other CEO’s, are 
presumptively insulated from statutory penalties for paying or authorizing excessive 
compensation.  (Treas. Reg. 53.4958-6).  Anecdotal evidence, such as Guidestar’s prominent 
warnings about manager-level 4958 penalties side-by-side with links for their “comparables 
study” service, suggest that managers value the safe harbor.  We propose making clear, public, 
and contemporaneous disclosure of the terms of each contract, along with valuations of the 
reasonably-expected costs of the contract terms computed along the lines of the revised 990 
Instructions, a requirement of the safe harbor.  That could help to ensure that donor pressure is 
directed towards the actual substance of each contract, not its reporting.  Our data also suggest 
that contemporaneity is important, because delays in reporting appear to result in delays in donor 
behavior.           
5.  Conclusion 
                                                 
37 A possible counter-argument to our suggestion here is that donor outrage is inefficient in some sense.  For 
example, suppose that donors have an aversion to what they view as excessive payments without regard to whether a 
given compensation package allows the firm to obtain equal or greater value in the performance of their executive.  
In that case, outrage could be a negative externality imposed on other stakeholders of the firm.  But even then we 
doubt that camouflage is the best solution, since camouflage also creates the opportunity for rents on the part of 
stakeholders who are not averse to high pay.  Better and more transparent stakeholder democracy, among other 
options, seem like better choices.   
23 
 
We provide data suggesting that greater reliance on contributions puts downward 
pressure on the reported compensation of presidents of private colleges and universities, that 
higher disclosed compensation tends to discourage giving, and that compensation of presidents 
of institutions with a religious affiliation are lower than those of peers at wholly secular schools.  
These results lend support to the theoretical suggestion that stakeholder outrage may constrain 
executive pay and may require some updating of the verity that contributors to nonprofit 
organizations are ineffective monitors.                   
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Table 1: 
Descriptive Statistics 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
 
Variable |          Observations  Mean      Std. Dev.    
 
% of Revenue from Gifts |       2990     .177       .190    
Annual Gifts |        2990     39984      91596    
Full-time Equivalent Enrollment |  2991     4808.47      4646.90    
F/T Execs. per 100 FTE Students | 2969     2.84       2.19 
Fundraising    2641  9996   22440 
Graduation Rate |         2128     .69       .16  
Gross Assets |         2991     1191360      3814800    
Hospital? (Indicator) |        2136     .05       .21     
Liabilities |         2991     310080      1446360    
Mean Faculty Salary |        2689     71.27      15.87   
Reported Pres. Benefits |        3565     53.59      88.96 
Reported Pres. Salary |       3578       286.88      180.76    
Revenues -- All Sources |        2991     322320      756840   
Revenues from Tuition |        2991     116484      139218  
Revenues from Grants |        2919     40596      121788    
Return on Investment |        2987     67728      359040   
Religious Affiliation? (Indicator)  |  3620     .46       .50     
President’s Years in Office |       3620     7.30       6.41       
SAT - 75th %ile |         2263     1293     125.3 
Staff Unionization (Indicator) 2811  .19   .39 
Total Reported Pres. Compensation |  3336       364.96     214.20    
 
Note: All dollar figures reported in thousands of 2007 dollars. 
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Table 2: 
Determinants of University President Compensation 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
 OLS Arellano-Bond 2SLS 
% gift -287,283.30 -169,919.3 - 1,978,243 
 (97,641.16)** (78,316.16)* (814,671.50)** 
% gift squared 549,525.79 336,157.6 3,020,202 
 (195,669.68)** (186,532.4)* (1366988)* 
Relig. affil. -43,180.33  - 25,310.71 
 (10,356.59)***  (11,549.74)* 
Staff union -11,526.80  2020.57 
 (19,107.65)  (14,072.34) 
Tuition 0.00070 . 00028 .0010 
 (0.00022)** (0. 000051)* (0. 00037)** 
Revenues 7.3e-6 0. 0000148 -0. 0000292 
 (0.000033) (0. 000020) (0. 000047) 
RoI -0.000044 -0. 000024 -0. 000044 
 (0.000035) (0. 000026) (0.000047) 
Log assets 17,425.49  28,201.06 
 (9,019.90)*  (11,487.42)** 
Grants -0.000050 8.94e-06 0. 000040 
 (0.000081) (0. 000079 ) (0.00019) 
Fac. salary 2.64 2.73 2.61 
 (1.01)** (0. 45)*** (1.32)* 
Enrollment -3.42  - 8.89 
 (2.31)  (4.97) 
Mean pres. pay -0.46 0. 41 -3.00 
 (1.57) (0. 10)*** (2.24) 
Years in offc. 2,840.02  2,661.42 
 (626.68)***  (706.29)*** 
Constant -143,952.97 -76505.85 393,247.8 
 (346,374.72) (25310.11)*** (518,026.8) 
R-squared .60  .48 
N 1,398 1,398 1,088 
 
Notes: 
*: statistically significant at the 5% level against a two-sided test of the null 
**: statistically significant at the 1% level against a two-sided test of the null 
***: statistically significant at the .1% level against a two-sided test of the null 
Robust standard errors clustered by president.  All regressors are lagged one year.  Control variables 
insignificant in all specifications are not reported.  Dollar figures reported in 1983 dollars.   
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Table 3: 
Determinants of Annual Contributions 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
 OLS Arellano-Bond 2SLS 
Lags of comp. -30.55 -28.36 -61.74 
  (total 1st & 2d) (12.27)* (5.79)*** (32.21) 
Revenues 0.062 0.0420 0.063 
 (0.0012)*** (0.0025)*** (0.0028)*  
Tuition -0.13 0.1226 -0.043 
 (0.137) (0.021)*** (0.045) 
Fundraising 1.86 2.3488 2.26 
 (1.20) (0.3143)*** (0.6017)*  
Fundraising ^2 -6.95e-8 -6.37e-8 -7.87e-8 
 (4.70e-8) (1.07e-8)*** (1.97e-8)*  
Grants 0.16 0.044 0.28 
 (0.126) (0.0151)** (0.023)**  
Liabilities 0.0018 0.0041 0.0036 
 (0.0013) (0.0011)*** (0.0007)*  
Log assets 3,222,737.78  1,267,480.71 
 (2,204,103.76)  (1,764,298.85) 
Enrollment 2,573.90 -1,488.99 882.58 
 (1708) (265.47)*** (691.54) 
Fac. salary 207.55  526.38 
 (231.91)  (222.65)* 
US News Top 25 27,414,397.74  9,855,543.69 
 (12,987,490.09)*  (9,045,568.049) 
Faculty:student -1,923,948.12  -2,193,387.77 
 (787,798.9)**  (284,323.08)*** 
Years in offc. 43,424.91  122,064.93 
 (157,480.11)  (120,069.21) 
Constant 0.0000 2,892,849.44 -28,840,388.90 
 (0.0000) (931,521.70)** (27,520,096.32) 
R-squared .90  .92 
N 1,185 965 1,185 
 
Notes: 
*: statistically significant at the 5% level against a two-sided test of the null 
**: statistically significant at the 1% level against a two-sided test of the null 
***: statistically significant at the .1% level against a two-sided test of the null 
Robust standard errors clustered by president.  Control variables insignificant in all specifications are not 
reported.  Dollar figures reported in 1983 dollars.   
 
 
  
  
27 
 
  
28 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Andreoni, James. 1990. “Impure Altruism and Donation to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-
Glow Giving.” The Economic Journal, Vol. 100, pp. 464-477.  
 
Andreoni, James and Abigail A. Payne. 2011. “Is Crowding Out Due Entirely to Fundraising? 
Evidence from a Panel of Charities.” Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 95, pp. 334-343. 
 
Angrist, Joshua D. and J. Pischke. 2009. “Mostly Harmless Econometrics.” Princeton, N. J.: 
Princeton University Press. 
 
Atwell, Robert and Jane V. Wellman. 2000. “Presidential Compensation in Higher Education: 
Policies and Best Practices.” AGB. 
 
Baker, George P. and Brian J. Hall. 2004. “CEO Incentives and Firm Size.” Journal of Labor 
Economics, Vol. 22, pp. 767-798. 
 
Banker, Rajiv D., Jose M. Plehn-Dujowich and Chunwei Xian. 2009.  “The Compensation of 
University Presidents: A Principal-Agent Theory and Empirical Evidence.”  Unpublished. 
 
Baum, Christopher F. 2006. “An Introduction to Modern Econometrics Using Stata.” Stata Press. 
 
Bebchuk, Lucian A., Jesse Fried, and David Walker. 2002. “Managerial Power and Rent 
Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation.” University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 
69, pp. 751-846. 
 
Bebchuk, Lucian A. and Robert J. Jackson, Jr. 2005. “Executive Pensions.” Journal of 
Corporation Law, Vol. 30, pp. 823-855. 
 
Ben-Ner, Avner. 1986. “Nonprofit organizations: Why do they exist in market economies?” In S. 
Rose-Ackerman (ed.), The Economics of Nonprofit Institutions: Studies in Structure and Policy, 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Bernheim, Dougals B. and Antonio Rangel. 2008. “Beyond Revealed Preference: Choice 
Theoretic Foundations for Behavioral Welfare Economics.” NBER Working Papers 13737, 
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. 
 
Bond, Stephen R.  2002.  “Dynamic panel data models: a guide to micro data methods and 
practice.”  Portuguese Economic Journal, Vol.1, pp. 141-162. 
 
29 
 
 
Boulanger, Kim and Jeffrey Pliskin. 1999. “Determinants of Compensation of College 
Presidents.” Hamilton College mimeo.  
 
Campbell, John L. 2007.  “Why Would Corporations Behave in Socially Responsible Ways? An 
Institutional Theory of Corporate Responsibility.”  Academy of Management Review, Vol. 36, 
pp. 947-967.  
 
Core, John E., Wayne R. Guay, and David F. Larcker. 2003. “Executive Equity Compensation 
and Incentives: A Survey.” FRBNY Economic Policy Review, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 27-50.   
 
Dukeminier, Jesse, Robert Sitkoff, and James Lindgren. 2010. “Wills, Trusts, and Estates.” 
Eighth Edition. Aspen Publishers.   
 
Ehrenberg, R. G. and M. J. Rizzo. 2004. “Resident and Non-Resident Tuition and Enrollment at 
State Flagship Universities. In, Hoxby, C. M., (ed), College Choices: The Economics of Where to 
Go, When to Go, and How to Pay For It, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 303-354. 
 
Ehrenberg, Ronald G., John J. Cheslock, and Julia Epifantseva. 2001. “Paying Our Presidents. 
What Do Trustees Value?” Review of Higher Education, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 15-37.  
 
Frydman, Carola and Dirk Jenter. 2010. “CEO Compensation.” Rock Center for Corporate 
Governance at Stanford University, Working Paper No. 77, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1582232. 
 
Frumkin, Peter and Elizabeth K. Keating. 2001. “The Price of Doing Good: Executive 
Compensation in Nonprofit Organizations.” Harvard University, Working Paper. 
 
Galle, Brian. 2010. “Keep Charity Charitable.” Texas Law Review, Vol. 88, pp. 1213.  
 
Gardiner, Joseph C., Zhehui Luo and Lee Anne Roman. 2009.  “Fixed effects, random effects, 
and GEE: What are the differences?”  Statistics in Medicine, Vol. 28, pp. 221-239. 
 
Hall, Brian J. and Jeffrey B. Liebman. 1998. “Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 113, pp. 653-691. 
 
Hall, Brian J. and Jeffrey B. Liebman. 2000. “The Taxation of Executive Compensation.” In 
James M. Poterba (ed), Tax Policy and the Economy, National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Vol. 14, pp. 1-44.   
 
30 
 
Hansmann, Henry B. 1980. “The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise.” Yale Law Journal, Vol. 89, No. 
5, pp. 835-901.   
 
Hardin, Russell. 1982. “Collective Action.” Johns Hopkins University.  
 
Holmström, Bengt R. 1982. “Moral Hazard in Teams.” The Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 13, 
pp. 324-340. 
 
Jackson, Robert J. Jr. 2009. “Private Equity and Executive Compensation.” (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
 
Jensen, Michael C. and William H. Meckling. 1976. “Theory of the Firm:  Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3, pp. 305-360.  
 
Jensen, Michael C. and Kevin J. Murphy. 1990b. “Performance Pay and Top-Management 
Incentives.” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98, pp. 225-264. 
 
Knoke, David. 1998.  “The Organizational State: Origins and Prospects.” Research in Political 
Sociology, Vol. 8, pp. 147-163. 
 
Langbert, Mitchell and Marc Fox. 2011. “The Compensation and Benefits of Private University 
and College Presidents.” Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2089641.  
 
Leete, Laura. 2006. “Work in the Nonprofit Sector.” In Richard Steinberg and Walter Powell 
(eds), The Nonprofit Sector Research Handbook, Second edition, pp. 159-179, Yale University 
Press. 
 
Leslie, Phillip and Paul Oyer. 2009. “Managerial Incentives and Value Creation: Evidence from 
Private Equity.” Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University, Working Paper 
No. 21.  
 
Lowry, R. C. 2001a. “The Effects of State Political Interests and Campus Output on University 
Revenues.” Economics of Education Review, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 105-119. 
 
Marwell, Gerald and Pamela Oliver. 1993. “The Critical Mass in Collective Action: A Micro-
social Theory.” Cambridge, U. K.: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Monks, James. 2007. “Public versus Private University Presidents Pay Levels and Structure.” 
Economics of Education Review, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 338-348.  
 
31 
 
Murphy, Kevin J. 1999. “Executive Compensation.” In Orley Ashenfelter (ed), Handbook of 
Labor Economics, Elsevier, pp. 2485‐2563.   
 
Nicklin, J. 2000. “Presidential Salaries.” The Chronicle of Higher Education, Vol. 47, No. 13, 
pp. A26-A28. 
 
Okten, C. and B. A. Weisbrod. 2000. “Determinants of Donations in Private Nonprofit Markets.” 
Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 75, pp. 255-272. 
 
Oster, Sharon M. 1998. “Executive Compensation in the Nonprofit Sector.” Nonprofit 
Management and Leadership, Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 207-221. 
 
Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. “Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective 
Action.” Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Rappaport, Alfred. 1999. “New Thinking on How to Link Executive Pay with Performance.” 
Harvard Business Review, Vol. 77, No. 2, pp. 91-101. 
 
Saez, Emmanuel, J. Slemrod, and S. Giertz. 2012. “The Elasticity of Taxable Income with 
Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review.” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 50, 
No. 1, pp. 3-50. 
 
Saunders, Kent T. 2007. “Salary Study of College Presidents and Faculty: Are Salaries for 
Institutions in the Council of Christian Colleges and Universities Different From Other Private 
Institutions?”  Christian Business Academy Review, Spring 2007, pp. 83-91. 
 
Sorokina, Olga V. 2003. “Executive Compensation: The Case of Liberal Arts College 
Presidents.” Issues in Political Economy, Vol. 12, pp. 1-16. 
 
Tang, T. L., et al. 1996. “The Pay-Performance Linkage Revisited: Is University Presidents’ Pay 
Related to Reputation Rating.” ERIC, pp. 1-28. 
 
Vesterlund, Lise. 2006. “Why do people give?” In W.Powell and R.S.Steinberg, (eds.), The 
Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook, Second Edition, pp. 568–587. 
 
Walker, David I. 2007. “Unpacking Backdating: Economic Analysis and Observations on the 
Stock Option Scandal.” Boston University Law Review, Vol. 87, pp. 561-623. 
 
